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Constitutional patriotism, citizenship, and
belonging
David Abraham*

Is constitutional patriotism a basis for a politics of solidarity and redistribution?
May more particularistic historical and cultural principles be added to the
abstract and formal-legal demands of constitutionalism without fundamentally undermining it? As we know, the political left, more than once, has sought
to speak for "the nation" as a concrete historical entity while, at the same time,
holding fast to universalist, constitutionalist principles. Indeed, it has been
argued that the left's most successful moments-from the French Revolution
to the interwar popular fronts, to Chinese and Vietnamese communism-have
been at those times when nation and class, the unique and the universal, the
concrete and the abstract, have been ostensibly joined. And, of course, the left
in postwar Germany has lived with a very difficult relationship to its particular
history and nation, as is apparent in the 1948 Grundgesetz, as well as in many
of the Habermasian formulations of constitutional patriotism with which we
have become familiar.
If "constitutional patriotism" is to mean something more than or different
from, say, civic nationalism, and if Verfassungspatriotismusis to signify more
than just the specific legal-political life of the liberal-socialist phase of the Bonn
Republic, it must offer something beyond mere resonance with one or more
distinct nation-state histories.1 It must somehow both accommodate and integrate them.
To begin with, solidarities and collective identities, no matter how constructed, simply have not gone away. Even the hippest pre-9/1 1 postnationalists, such as Arjun Appadurai, had to claim that countries were "one node in a
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285-287 (2006). Miller concludes that the fact of a specific genealogy cannot discredit the broader application and availability of Verfassungpatriotismus.This is certainly true. It seems to me, however, that this conclusion is itself severely undercut by the masterfully sensitive understanding of
the Bonn Republic laid out in the essay.
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post-national network of diasporas." 2 In this posited transnational world,
belonging-for the individual-is multiple and variously institutionalized but
still concrete and less than volitional. Riva Kastoryano claims, for example,
that "the country of origin becomes a source of identity, the country of residence a source of rights, and the emerging transnational space, a space of political action combining the two or more countries."3 If these claims are even
partly true, we have to ask what or which solidarity it is that might, legitimately, dare to demand the sacrifice of some individual and/or most competing
collective identities. Christendom, the Volk, subjects of His Majesty, the proletariat, the polls, France, people of color, le peuple, the Constitution, the West
are, today, not all equally appealing organizing principles, though each of
them has been successful in the past.
It may be argued that the very notion of a collective identity based on and
reinforcing solidarity is itself a fraud, the fruit of successful power and governance claims by self-interested or hegemonic power blocs. "We, the People,"
a cultural community exercising self-government through popular sovereignty, simply may not exist. Though associated with elements of the political
right, the claim has also come from segments of the left-namely, that there is
no such thing as society, only individuals (or classes) who (sometimes) choose
to subject themselves to a nexus of contracts that regulate but do not frame
their lives. 4 Not much fellow feeling or solidarity or willingness to sacrifice may
be expected from mere cohabitation for individual instrumental purposes, even
if that cohabitation takes place under shared constitutional and legal rules.
Transnational ties, for example, cut across the vertical solidarity of the
nation-state and weaken state-society relations. Rights, whether achieved
by ascription or through conquest, like the assumption of duties, require
some measure of fraternitg, belonging, fellow feeling. Rights are related to

2 Arjun Appadurai, The Heart of Whiteness, 16 CAuALoo 796, 798, 803 (1993) (emphasis added).

Appadurai, self-described repentant nationalist, avers that "[w]here soil and place were once the
key to the linkage of territorial affiliation ... key identities and affiliations now only partially revolve around the realities and images of space." Now "diaspora runs with, not against, the grain of
identity, movement, and reproduction." Diaspora seems to be construed now not as an exile from
which one will eventually return but rather as a kind of postnational hybridity--one is tempted to
say a cosmopolitanism for Everyman. The world may look more like this when seen from the "platinum elite" frequent-flyer lounge than when seen from the polyglot streets.
3

SOC. So.J.311
See Riva Kastoryano, Settlement, TransnationalCommunities and Citizenship,52 INAr'L
(2000) (describing transnational activity in several forms, including a focus on the "home" country, Europe, and even Islam).
4 See

WuRam voN HuMBowur, VESUCH DIEGRENZEN DER WIRKSAMKEIT

DES STAATES

ZU BESUMMN [ THE LIMITs

(Cambridge Univ. Press 1969) (1792), for the modern version of the classical view
that human social interdependency and solidarity, facilitated by a state, were prerequisites for Entfaltung (self-fulfillment). See also JOHN RAwts, A THEORY oF JUsTIcE 524 (Harvard Univ. Press 1971)
(restating this view).
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belonging. Certainly each ascending step in the staircase of rights laid out in
T. H. Marshall's classic formulationS---civil rights to political rights to social
rights-assumes a greater measure of solidarity than the step below. Thus, civil
rights may be granted even by an undemocratic and unrepresentative sovereign to citizens and subjects alike; political rights mostly presume some measure
of self-governance as well as membership; and social rights, in addition, a willingness to be the keeper of others as a matter of shared minimum expectation.
Some sense of historical community and shared destiny or of citizenship is a
prerequisite for social rights. These cannot be awarded simply as a matter of
rule or constitutional mandate. Those who value social justice must have an
historically and geographically defined place for its exercise. This sentiment
can be designated, in the Mazzinian tradition, as "patriotism" (Viroli) or as that
of the "cosmopolitan patriot" (Appiah) or, in an older vocabulary, even as an
"internationalist."6 Affection, loyalty, history, literature, language, traditions,
and so forth-these are the passions of a proper patriotism. Perhaps this is all
merely talk of an "imagined community," a collective imaginary fit for the era
of print capitalism as Anderson would have it. But perhaps not. The imaginary
national identification actually may be a continuously constructed, contested,
negotiated, and historically contingent, path-dependent project.
Popular front strategies, as already noted, have attempted to capture
national community sentiment on behalf of an agenda combining social justice, class, and national interests.' In the case of the U.S., for example, Paul
Robeson conveyed a sense of this amalgam in his immensely successful popular front ballad "The House I Live In," a song that defined commonality and
shaped it around both abstractconstitutional principles and concrete historical
and cultural experiences:
What is America to me?
A name, a map, a flag I see,
A certain word, "Democracy."
The words of old Abe Lincoln,
of Jefferson and Paine

T. H. MARsHALL, CrrmNznPs AND SocAL CLASS (Pluto 1950). Though endlessly criticized from nearly
every possible perspective, Marshall's paradigm remains at the center of the discussion.
6 MAURIZIO VIRoLI, FOR LOVE OF CoUNTy: AN ESSAY ON PATRIOTISM AND NATIONALISM

1995); K. Anthony Appiah, Cosnmopolitan Patriots,in CosMoP'onrcs:

(Oxford Univ. Press

THNKING AND FEELING
BEYOND THE

(Pheng Cheah & Bruce Robbins eds., Univ. Minnesota Press 1998). Appiah seeks to connect
species-wide community with the actual politics and restraints found on the ground locally. But
"think globally, act locally" is also what Paul Robeson-quoted infra, note 8-was saying. It was
also the internationalist message of the socialist Second International: "Workers of the World
Unite: Go Home and Organize." See JAMEs JoLL, THE SECOND INTERNATIONAL (Routledge 1955).
NATION

7 THE RISE AND FALL OFTHE

Univ. Press 1989).

NEW DEAL ORDER, 1930-80 (Steve Fraser &Gary Gerstle eds., Princeton
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of Washington and Douglass
and the tasks that still remain.
The house I live in,
My neighbors white and black,
The people who just came here
and from generations back
A house that we call "freedom,"
the home of liberty,
But especially the people,
8
That's America to me.
Viroli and Appiah may be construed in much the same way, placing specific
cultural and historical flesh on a framework of norms. Such a position has also
been restated, recently, by Alexander Aleinikoff:
The idea of belonging is... intergenerational. One is a citizen of an ongoing historical project that looks back to the settlement of the continent,
the creation of the nation, and seminal events in the past. No matter
when their ancestors arrived ...Americans can claim the Founding
Fathers as their own without a sense of irony. 9
Lincoln, for one, in his first inaugural address, famously called upon his fellow
citizens' "mystic chords of memory" to undergird and strengthen their fragile
constitutional patriotism.1"
Robeson's words point clearly to a regime of universal (and necessarily
revisable) principles specified by a particular political community through
democratic procedures, one that has a history and that newcomers can and
should join and shape. They join a work-in-progress, if not one that is arbitrarily or indeterminately contestable. When Robeson beckons listeners to join at
"Gettysburg and Concord, where Freedom's fight began," he echoes the principle that newcomers "too were at Mt. Sinai."'" The particular culture and
The House I Live In, on SONGS OF FREE Mm (Columbia Records 1947) (lyrics by Lewis
Allan). Robeson also sings of battles, Lexington, Concord, Gettysburg, and Battan, as well as of
farmers, workers, and neighbors. See also Daniel Levy, The Transformation of Germany's EthnoCulturalIdiom, in CHALLENGING
ETHNIC CrnZENsmp 232 n.1 (Daniel Levy &Yfatt Weiss eds., Berghahn
2002) (speaking similarly of a "changeable product of collective self-identification").
8 PAUL ROBESON,

9ALANDER ALEn'non', SEWLANCES OF SovERnoNTY 478 (Harvard Univ. Press 2002). See alsoJoHN RAWLS,
LAW OFPEOPLES 23,44

(Harvard Univ. Press 1999) (observing that such pride and achievements may
produce what John Rawls called a "proper patriotism" and John Stuart Mill labeled "common sympathies," presumably real or imagined, into reality). Indeed, one way to understand "Constitutional
patriotism" is as the sum of "proper patriotism" + "common sympathies" + Founding Fathers.
'oPresident Abraham Lincoln, Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861).
RROBESON, supra note 8.
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tradition that makes "our" constitution ours must be constructed on a foundation of equal liberal rights for all (that is, liberty), democracy, and a capacious
sense of identity. Together these make and are made by "the people," which is
to say, a contingent community of memory and experience united also-if not
only-by shared attachment to a body of principles. In this view, national
identity becomes a mutable product of collective self-identification.
A nation, as Ernest Renan observed more than a century ago, is a "daily
plebiscite" in which values and consent and "the desire to live together" are
repeatedly adopted or rejected. However, as Renan also observed, today's
nation "is the culmination of a long past of endeavors, sacrifice, and devotion"
that go beyond any shared political principles or constitutional patriotism to
create an inherited cultural identity.12 This inherited cultural identity of
"endeavors, sacrifice, and devotion" is also, for Renan at least, the history of
struggles for sovereignty and for popular self-determination.
We might usefully view the modern nation and its citizens as the products of
four actual or metaphorical centuries and of the concerns that characterized
each: first, the construction of order and security within a territory; next, the
search for a viable contract of consent among those present within a territory;
third, the assertion of popular sovereignty and self-rule in politics and economics by those within the territory; and, finally and most recently, the struggle
between the imperatives of liberty and those of governance. It is as a product of
the particular forms these experiences take that the citizen emerges.
Who is the citizen-the resident of "the house I live in"--of the commonality made of the plurality transcending particularity, as Robeson could have put
it? The collective and legally recognized identity of the "citizen" is and always
has been unstable and contested. 3 Still, as Max Weber noted already in 1921,
citizenship is a constructed position defining status, one that interacts with

12 Ernest

Renan, What Is a Nation?, in

NATION AND NARRATION

19 (Homi Bhabha ed., Routledge

1990). See also Bernard Yack, The Myth of the Civic Nation, 10 CRmncAL REv. 198 (1996). Yack underscores that, alongside the ethnic-nation myth of inherited cultural identity, there is a civicnation myth suggesting that "national identity is nothing but your choice: you are the political
principles you share with other like-minded individuals."
13For

the U.S., see, most recently, RocEs

TORY(Yale

SMrFH, CIvIc IDEALs: CONFuCTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN U.S. HIS-

Univ. Press 1997): for the earlier period, see JAMES

KIrm , Tae DEVELOPMENT OFAMEIdcAN
Crizesrm, 1608-1870 (Univ. North Carolina Press 1978). For advocacy of a new universal nationalist citizenship, see McIAa bIND,
, THE NEX AMERIcAN NATION (Free Press 1996); for a rejection of such
a conception, see Iris Marion Young, Polity and GroupDifference; A Critiqueof the Ideal of Universal Citizenship, 99 ETmcs 250 (1989). For an overview of the concept in Israel, see Ayelet Shachar, Citizenship
andMembership in the Israeli Polity, in FROM MIGRANTS TO CIMzeS: MEMBERSHIP IN A CHANGING WoR 386
(T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Douglas Klusmeyer eds., Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

2000). For Germany, see Rooams BRUBAR, CilzENsHw AND NATIONHOOD IN FRANcE AND GERMANY
(Harvard

Univ. Press 1992): OI'ENE STAATucmT: FEScIFr FtR E.W. BOcKENFREO [THE OPEN STATE: CoLETmON IN
HONOR OFE. W. BiceKENmRDe] (RolfGrawert &Bernard Schlink eds., Duncker & Humblot 1995): and K
HALERONNER & GtNTHE RENeue, STAATSANGEHORiGETSREcHT [Cmzesf LAW] (C.H. Beck 1991).
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and mitigates other positions, such as those involving class and power. This is
why elites, with considerable force at their disposal, generally attempt to
weaken citizenship status, and why subversive forces interested in organizing
and acting on the basis of class often consider citizenship a false consciousness,
a (mere) bourgeois-nationalist patriotism turned against class interest.14
Citizenship, active social membership, and solidarity generate rights, and
these rights often provide the basis for an assortment of claims. Not so long ago
it seemed uncontroversial that the demand for equal citizenship, for political
equality under a constitution, would turn into a demand for a different kind of
society altogether. 5 Such claims are raised in a common public realm and profess to be for the collective good. For citizenship to work, subidentities or community identities must remain peripheral or, at least, amenable to overarching
ideologies, such as constitutional patriotism, that can encompass all of the citizenry. The recent weakness of egalitarian ideologies and parties owes at least
something to the rejection of common and equal citizenship.
Democracy, as a form of life based on active consent and participation, has
receded while citizenship is distributed on the basis of passive criteria of belonging, territorially or ethnically. For the most part, this decline in the civic republican has been accompanied by a decline in the ethnonational. The civic fades
into the civil while the distinction between citizen and alien fades in a way redolent of the decline of estate, rank, and order. Instead, everyone emphatically
16
has rights, and individuals and groups compete on the basis of them.
The outcome of the American liberal legal transformation since the civil
rights era has been, above all, the creation of a rights culture, one which is
overwhelmingly universalist and individualist. This marks a substantial departure from the jurisprudence of the Depression, the New Deal, and war years,

14In Europe and America, this sentiment peaked around World War I, and conflicts over what to
do split and destroyed international socialism. The union sacrie and the Burgfrieden and their flagwaving repressive analogue in the U.S. worked in this way, and "internationalism" has not been
more than a slogan since then.
15This

"classic" position can be found in RnNiLao BENDnx, NATION ButlDING

AND CIzmsHp

86-126

(Anchor 1969).
6

The individualistic and individualizing apolitical side of rights and of the "rights revolution" in the
U.S. has been the subject of analysis by conservatives and radicals alike. See, e.g., MARY ANN GLINON,
RiGmrs TALK: THE L~wovuswAENr oF PoLmcAL DLSOURSE (Free Press 1991 ): STUART SCIEINGoLD. TH PoLmcs
OFRicas (Yale Univ. Press 1974); Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEx. L. Rsv. 1363 (1984);
Morton Horwitz, Rights, 23 HARv. Civ. RTs.-Cv. Lmms REV. 393 (1988): Anthony Chase. The Left on

Rights, 62 Tax. L.REV. 1541 (1984); David Abraham, Are Rights the Right Thing?, 25 CoN. L. REv. 947
(1993). The situation in Germany is still quite different, notwithstanding the enlargement of individual rights there over the past thirty years. This will be addressed below. The individualizing force
of rights-consciousness has been very visible and important in Israel over the past decade. See Tim NEw
IsRAE: PAcmAiNG AD'oLmaLAu7Azo. (Gershon Shafir & Yoav Peled eds., HarperCollins 2000); Menachem Hofnung, The UnintendedConsequences of UnplannedConstitutionalReform, 44 Aaim. J.CoxMi.
L.
485 (1996); Chaim Edelman, The Judicializationof Politicsin Israel, 15 L'-r'L POL. Sci. R.E'. 177 (1994).
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which was, for the most part, more collectivist and national.' 7 A similar,
though later, story may also be told of Germany and other countries.
Human rights and state sovereignty claims may come into conflict with
each other; however, it is important to remember that the latter may also be a
vehicle for the former. This relationship has been difficult since the revolutionary Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen of 1789. Why would the universal rights of man require the particularism of citizenship? As Hannah Arendt
explained it, "abstract" human beings existed "nowhere." Hence,
The whole question of human rights... was quickly and inextricably blended
with the question of national emancipation; only the emancipated sover8
eignty of the people, of one's own people, seems to be able to insure them.i
A cosmopolitan world society of rational individuals cannot exist in anything
like a democratic world of mass participation. Even at their most ambitious, postWorld War 1I hopes for the United Nations and world government were predicated on democratic national polities, federating as units, in order to establish
international governance. National communities seem necessary to support those
very rights and freedoms promised to all in the Declaration of the Rights of Man
and Citizen and similar documents. Today, most nation-states, in fact, justify their
legitimacy on the basis of universalist human rights principles mediated through
their particular histories and institutions. As Seyla Benhabib has observed,
The tension between the universalistic scope of the principles that legitimize the social contract of the modern nation, and the claim of this nation to define itself as a closed community, plays itself out in the history
of the reforms and revolutions of the last two centuries.19
One risk in this, of course, is that nation-states may equate the citizen with
the member of the historical or ethnic nation, thereby collapsing a worthy
I7 This is a substantial claim but, on balance, right. See NISON LICHTITEN=,

STATE OFTHEUNION:

A CENTURY

OFAMERICAN LABOR (Princeton Univ. Press 2002); LAwRENcE FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAw (2d ed.,
Touchstone 1986) (1973); KERMI' HAuL, THE MAGc MIRROR 247-332 (Oxford Univ. Press 1989); ALAN
BRmraY, THE E'N OF REFoR: NEw DEAL LIBERAuSM IN REcEssioN AND WAR (Knopf 1995). The ACLU has
played a remarkable role in the successes of the individual-rights culture; see SAMUEL WATE, INDEFENsE
OF AMERICAN LnERS: A HIsinRY OF THEACLU (2d ed., Southern Illinois Univ. Press 1999) (1990). The
German and Israeli law systems may well be following the same trajectory but are lagging behind.
Weimar law and early Israeli law were certainly more like American collectivism at its peak. See GUtnmT
FRANKENBERG
& ULRICH RODEL, VON DERVOLUSSOUVERANrrAT ZIJMMhNDIEscmn'zSC[

[FROM POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY

TOMNoRTY PROTECTnON] (Europ. Vlg.-Anst.

1981 ); MENAcHM HOFNUNG. DEMocRA cY, LAw AND NATIONAL SEcJRm INIsRARI.
(Dartmouth 1996): PNINA LAnAv, JuDGMiNrr INJERusUT (Univ. Calif. Press 1997).
18HANNAH AREnDr, THE ORuINS OFTorAurARIANiSM 291 (Harvest 1979) (1951). See William Sewell,

Le Citoyen/la Citoyenne: Activity, Passivity and the Revolutionary Concept of Citizenship,in THn FRENCH
REVOLUTION AND THE CREATION OF MODERN POLITICAL CULTUE: THE POLTICAL CULTURE OF THE FRENCH REVOLU-

TION 105 (Colin Lucas ed., Elsevier 1988) (on how this citizenship activates and is activated).
19Seyla Benhabib, Citizens, Residents and Aliens in a Changing World, 66 Soc. RES. 735 (1999).
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political and legal category into an inegalitarian schema of first-class and
second-class semicitizens sorted by nationality or ethnicity. Here Arendt's
experience as a refugee, someone made stateless on account of her ethnicity,
led her not to turn against states and toward human rights internationalism
but, rather, to insist that states be civic polities with citizenship based on legal
criteria. Indeed, all those born into a territorial state had the human right to
citizenship in it.
Universalism and constitutionalism would thus temper the demos.
This position found its way into the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, article 15 of which proclaims that everyone has a right to a
nationality, something not otherwise to be taken for granted.2 0 The
development of an international human rights regime has been pushed
forward and earned praise from many quarters; nonetheless, ordinary
citizens, who might have some voice in a democratic nation-state, are
here unrepresented. 21
How closed are the "closed" communities Benhabib refers to, and how,
potentially, do abstract principles such as civic nationalism or constitutional patriotism facilitate entry and coherence? In the view of many, the
U.S. is characterized by a "thin" equal protection model of citizenship
involving mostly negative rights. Civil rights and physical and social mobility are almost all that autonomous individuals need. Legal equality is about
due process and equal protection for persons. The antidiscrimination model
of equal protection is hegemonic and makes group rights problematic; at
the same time, it also impedes the elaboration of social rights to education,
housing, and so on. The American immigration regime, in turn, "pays little
attention to the thin fabric of social and political rights that US citizenship

20

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 15, General Assembly Res. 217A (I1), U.N. GAOR

3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948); see Thomas Kleven, Why Immigration Law FavorsEmigration over Immigration, 33 UNIV. MtAmi INT-AMm. L. REv. 69, 82 (2002). In September 2002, in
the midst of severe Palestinian-Israeli violence, the Israeli interior minister, claiming to base himself on clause 11/B of the Citizenship Law, moved successfully to strip several native-born Arab
Israelis of their citizenship, arguing that they had left the country to work with its enemies. The
Association for Civil Rights in Israel sued, claiming that it "violated the basic human right to hold
citizenship" as well as the Universal Declaration, Ha'aretz, (Sept. 10, 2002). See also Yoav Peled,
Citizenship Betrayed: Israel's Emerging Immigrationand Citizenship Regime, 8 THEORmcAL INQuImS IN
LAw 603-628 (2007); Yousef Jabareen, An Equal Constitutionfor All? 61-67 (Mossawa Center
2007), availableat http://www.mossawacenter.org/files/files/File/An%20Equal%2OConstitution
%20For%20All.pdf.
21Compare the claims of Peter Spiro, who champions non-governmental organizations and other

groups as platforms, and Ruti Teitel, who claims that most polities cannot internally generate
norms as effective and progressive as those imposed through international claims. See Peter Spiro,
The Citizenship Dilemma, 51 STANFORD L. REv. 597 (1999); Run Tmn, TRRNSmONAL JUsncE (Oxford
Univ. Press 2000).
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entails" and, instead, tries to "create many jobs and keep them relatively
open to international labour. "22
Thus, the American system is about large numbers of immigrants; large
numbers of available jobs; the easy adjustment between types of status and
visa permissions; the easy transition to citizenship through naturalization and
immediate jus soli birthright citizenship; poor border control; overburdened
administrative apparatuses; negligible deportation rates; paltry social benefits;
and minimal benefit from obtaining citizenship.
By contrast, German citizenship, like (Jewish) Israeli citizenship, is perceived
as "thick," with sharper exclusions and greater and more explicit social rights
and duties. Until very recently, Germany's entry regime, in turn, was marked
by strong border and internal administrative apparatuses, little likelihood of
adjustment between and among categories of visa permissions, an exceedingly
low naturalization rate, no jus soli birthright citizenship, highly regulated
labor markets, a strong system of available social welfare benefits, and a high
salience extended to citizenship.23 Where U.S. citizenship is putatively constitutional and consensual, Germany, like Israel, has privileged ethnocultural
identity and national belonging within formal democracy. 24 Indeed, in the
Israeli case, Jewish nationality was historically essential for legal entry into the
country, and service in its military the chief method for entrance into its welfare system. In contrast, American citizenship is a lesser marker, though easy
to obtain; German and Israeli a greater, although more difficult marker to
acquire.
Eroded in numerous ways, from above and from below, the salience of citizenship seems to be declining, even in Germany, where the process of becoming a citizen by birth or naturalization is now much easier. The force of
citizenship is giving way, in the worried view of many nationalists, to the free
market, on the one hand, and to group recognition and calls for ethnic and
22 See Thomas Heller, Change and Convergence: Is American Immigration Still Exceptional?, in CrnzENsHIP IN A GLOBAL WORLD: COMPARINGCmZENSHI' RIGHTS FOR ALIENS 196-197 (Atsushi Kondo ed.,

Palgrave Macmillan 2001). Heller's emphasis on "exit" and mobility in the U.S. regime-as
opposed to "voice" and engagement in the European is redolent of Sombart's focus on immigration
as one reason there was no socialism in the U.S. See also ROBERT WIEBE, Sap-RLE: A CuLTuRAL HISTORY
OFAMERICAN DEMocCY (Univ. Chicago Press 1995).
23

Heller argues that membership came to mean more in Europe because: population was denser;

effective bureaucracies already existed; external threats required a standing military; states had to
compete for loyalty from populations whose identities had been fluid or local for a long time; mercantilist and imperial traditions has established interventionist government; and political rights
were slow in developing. See Heller, supra note 22, at 214.
24

For interpretations of "ethnic democracy" in Israel, see Sammy Smooha, Minority Status in an

Ethnic Democracy: The Status of the Arab Minority in Israel, 13 ETNIC & RACIAL STM. 389 (1990);
Yoav Peled, Ethnic Democracy and the Legal Constructionof Citizenship, 86 AMEB. POL. Sa. REv. 432
(1992); and OEN YirrAcH, ETHNocRAcY: LAND, AN THE POLICS OF IDENTY ISRaL/PALEsTINE (Univ.
Penn. Press 2006).
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religious group rights and concomitant parochialism, on the other. "McWorld"
confronts "Jihad" as material global integration confronts ethnic and cultural
fragmentation. 21 We have been reminded that there are many things for which
people will die or kill, the nation-state being only one and hardly the worst. The
continued growth in human migration under conditions of a weak state, or
states that choose to act as if they were weak, will accelerate or exacerbate
these tendencies, both benign and ghastly. We might worry, therefore, less
about the construction of the nation and more about citizens' democratic control over the state, a control that itself requires a measure of solidarity to
achieve. Whether constitutional patriotism can offer an adequate counterweight to centrifugal tendencies of this sort is far from certain.

Germany: From rights to citizenship
Jus sanguinis has stood at the center of German nationality (Staatsangeh6rigkeit)
and citizenship (Biirgerschaft).But it would be a mistake to conclude that only
ethnonationalism drives the German sense of belonging. Through the middle
of the nineteenth century, German identities were state-centered. Indeed, since
most German areas were overpopulated, rulers were content to shed emigrants. On the other hand, the Prussian Emancipation Edict of 1812 granted
Jews citizenship without regard to ethnicity, and, earlier still, Prussia had welcomed French Huguenots and Salzburg Protestants. Political loyalty rather
than ethnic affinity drove this phase of state building. As Hegel's 1821
Philosophy of Right made clear, the state was the culmination of the "ethical
life"; concepts of nation or folk were not up to such a task, and forget the demos.
And so it was that the 1842 Prussian Untertanengesetz (Law on Subjects of the
State) came to reflect this view.
It was in 1848, however, at the Paulskirche in Frankfurt that this began to
change. Up to the middle of that year the goal of a united and/or liberal
Germany included multinational Austria. The kleindeutsch solution-ethnic
and spatial homogeneity-only triumphed among the democrats and "small
German" radicals in response to their abandonment and defeat by the forces of
aristocracy and empire. 26 The North German Confederation and then, after
1870, the German Empire adopted the territory-based rule of citizenship. It
was only after the rightward turn of the German conservatives, trying to catch
up with right-wing populism after 1895, that "blood" became a key concept in

25See BENIAM

BABaE, STROx

DEocORACy

(Univ. Calif. Press 1984); and

BEJAMIN BARBER, JiHAD Vs.

McWoRw (Crown 1995).
26The

classic discussions of these developments remain: THEODORE

HA.IEROW, REsToRATION, REvOLU-

95-196 (Princeton Univ. Press 1958); LEONARD KRiEGE,. TBE GEsLsAN IDEA OF FIEEooM
273-397 (Beacon 1957); HANs Kor, PRELUDE TONATION STATES (D. Van Nostrand 1967). For the
conventional starting point, see BRUraIER, supra note 13.
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German citizenship.27 In this atmosphere, the 1913 Reichs- und Staatsangeh6rig
keitsgesetz finally went fully ethnic.
Nationality as a "national bond" between the German Empire and Germans
living abroad was confirmed and was not dissolved even when the period of
residence abroad was long-term. To ensure state control, at all times, over the
naturalization of immigrant workers, the principle of family, ethnic descent
was reasserted against territorialism, with the law confirming a basic ethnoc28
ultural notion of citizenship as a national community of descent.
The loss of German territories and populations after 1919 (and 1945) made
revision of the 1913 principles difficult since revision would have meant
renouncing rather large territorial claims and accepting substantial population losses. Efforts by Social Democrats and others during the Weimar Republic
to reintroduce jus soli principles into citizenship law failed, in part, because
efforts to democratize the country generally were stymied by the forces of rightwing reaction 29 Friedrich Meinecke's widely propagated postwar view of
Germans bound together by culture was as partial and distorted as his pre-war
30
view that Germans were constituted by blood and tribe.
After 1945, with the country both divided and flooded with refugees from
territories no longer under its control, the 1913 principles were reinstated with
only the Nazi exclusion and racial expulsion principles stripped away. In addition, of course, the Basic Law of 1949 required Bonn to look after the interests
of both halves of the country-the "two German states" view emerging only
very late in the game.
As a result, and despite the rapid growth of the foreigner population, until
2000 a child acquired German citizenship only by descent from a German parent. Naturalization was contemplated in the law, but as a rarity: with ten
27See P.G.J.

PuLzER, THE RIsE OFPOLITICAL ANTI-SEIIsM

Wiley & Sons 1964); JACK WERTHEIMER,
(Oxford Univ. Press 1987).
28 Dieter

IN GERMANY ANDAUSTRInA
118-126,

226 (John

UNWELCOME
STRANGERS: EAST EUROPEAN JEWS IN IMPERIAL GERMANY

Gosewinkel, Citizenship and Naturalization in Modem German and Austrian History 3

(July 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). Elsewhere, he stresses that the ethnonationalist victory of 1913 was a narrow one and hardly irreversible; see Dieter Gosewinkel,
Citizenship and NaturalizationPolitics in Germany in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, in CHALLENGING
ETHNIC CrnmismH', supra note 8, at 59; and DIETER GosweaNx. EiNBORGERN uND AusscHLEBEN:
DiE NATIONAUISIERUNG DER STAATSANGEHORIGKEIT [NATURALIZATION AND EXCLUSION: THE NATIONALIZATION OF

CrrmNSfmP] 278-368 (Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 2001).
29 On immigration reform efforts in the Weimar years, see Klaus Baade, Immigration, Naturaliza-

tion, and Ethno-NationalTraditions in Germany, in CROSSING BOUNDAMES: THE EXCLUSION ANDINCLUSION OF
MINORITIES IN GERMANY AND AMERICA 29 (Larry E. Jones ed., Berghahn 2001); and Jochen Oltmer,
Migrationand PublicPolicy in Germany, 1918-39,in
3

CROSSING BOONDA IES,

o See FRiEDRicK MEINEe, COSMOPOLITANISM ANDTHE NATIONAL STATE

Meinecke's prewar view, see

id. at 50.

9 (Princeton Univ. Press 1970). For

FRIEDRICK MEiNEcKE, THE GEMAN CATASTROPHE

(Harvard Univ. Press

1963). On the interaction of culture and economy, see RALF DAHRENDoR, Socwfr AND
GEMtNY 5, 21 (Anchor 1967): HAROLD JAMES, A GERMAN IoEtrrr 3 (Routledge 1989).
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years' problem-free residence in the country, a foreigner could apply for a discretionary (that is, not of right) grant of naturalization. Renunciation of other
loyalties was essential, but more importantly, applicants had to show a "turn
to Germanness" (Hinwendung zum Deutschtum), including language proficiency
and declared constitutional loyalty. 1 A mutual lack of interest led to an average of only 15,000 naturalizations annually between 1974 and 1984. With
the reduction of "administrative discretion" in 1984, the number climbed to
35,000 in 1985, and by 1997 it had reached 80,000, so that, by 2000, over
one million people had naturalized as German in the Bundesrepublik.
While German citizenship law evolved only slowly from its original ethnic
premises, there developed, in parallel, a theory of abstract, universalist popular
sovereignty that came to be identified with "constitutional patriotism."
Especially after the post-1968 reforms-and not withstanding such moments
of regression as the 1972 Anti-Radicalism Decree (Radikalenerlass), the
Professional Disqualification Policy (Berufsverbot), and the like, the integument
of West German society, generally, became civic, voluntary, nonbiological,
and a matter of communicative reciprocity. Constitutional patriotism makes of
national belonging a form of rational attachment that is compatible with liberal commitments to individual rights as well as with social commitments to
equality. The Constitution is, in Germany at least, a liberal democratic and
social democratic commitment, and, therefore, German constitutional patriotism goes beyond civic nationalism. 2
Verfassungspatriotismus reached its apogee in Germany in the years just
before and just after unification. Sometime in the 1990s, however, it came to
appear ahistorical, proceduralist, formalistic, and cold. The civic, it turned out,
is necessary but not sufficient. Habermas, for one, concluded as much, and he
tried to show that even constitutionalism can become more substantive,
embedded, thicker, and communitarian exclusionary. 3 And even civic
national identities are culturally inherited artifacts, developing as they pass
from generation to generation. Like historically embedded cultures, they
belong to some people but must be learned by others, even if only through a
process of "naturalization" or Einbfirgerung, the effectiveness of which we
1 Most of the data here is drawn from PoucY ANTDLAW CONCERNING

FOREIGNERS
IN GERMANY(Bundesmin-

isterium 2000) and Rainer Mdinz, Ethnos or Demos? Migrationand Citizenship in Germany, in CHALLENGING
ETHNIC CmzENsHP, supra note 8, at 19, 25.
32For a representative discussion, see Donald Kommers, Germany: Balancing Rights and Duties, in
INTERPETING CONsTMMONs: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 161 (Jeffrey Goldsworthy ed., Oxford Univ. Press

2006).
11Habermas elaborated on the concept of constitutional patriotism over a number of years; see
JORGEN
HABmMAS, BorwEEN FACTS AND Nomus: CoN-mruUrION TO ADIScoURsE THEORY OFLAw ANDDEMocRAcY

491-515, 566-567 (MIT Press 1996). By the end of the 1990s. Habermas had become aware that
even constitutional procedural principles required some historical, cultural embeddedness. See
JURGEN
HAE
ImAS, THE LNCLUSION
OFTHE OTHER 105-154 (MIT Press 1998).
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might be able to test. 4 Civic national identities are simply not as contractual as
constitutional and procedural agreements may be.
For Germany, but not only for Germany, national belonging is a more-thanrational attachment; it encompasses "the contingent inheritance of distinctive
experiences and cultural memories that is an inseparable part" of every national
identity.35 As admirable as constitutional patriotism is, as a theory for organizing a polity, national belonging needs-and assumes-more. It assumes some
overarching, shared prepolitical community, subsuming formal agreements
on legal-procedural rules and making, thereby, a nation something more than
a political community organized around voluntary association.
The shortcomings of constitutional patriotism as a social integument were
obscured by the economic strength of the German welfare state and by its treatment of the state's denizens; the limits have since been laid bare in the course
of immigration reform.36 Millions came from abroad to work in the Germany of
the economic miracle. By the time recruitment was stopped in 1973, there
were four million foreigners in West Germany. Family unification and formation could be made difficult but not stopped, so the numbers continued to grow.
And life without citizenship was not life without any rights or without solidarities. In 2000, there were approximately 7.5 million foreigners living in
Germany or nearly 10 percent of the population--of these nearly 1.5 million,
or 20 percent, were born in Germany. In fact, one-third of all foreigners have
been in Germany for over twenty years; 40 percent for over fifteen years, and
half for over ten years. About 30 percent of foreigners are Turkish, 15 percent
Yugoslav, and 24 percent EU, with a third of that being Italian.
Long-term foreign residents, or denizens, have enjoyed the same labormarket regulations and preferences as Germans and the same social benefits,
as well. 37 Given a much higher density of unionized workers than in the U.S.,
14It is, as they used to say, "not an accident" that in both Germany and the U.S. there is today a
great deal of concern over testing the competence or fidelity of those going through a naturalization or Einbzrgerung.And these tests are about both the Constitution and cultural Landschaft. For
an extreme version of the claim that citizenship is a falsely universalist claim that suppresses immigrant and minority cultures, see Leti Volpp, The Culture of Citizenship, 8 THEOwrrcAL INQUIRIES
IN
LAw 571 (2007).

11Bernard Yack, The Myth of the Civic Nation, 10

CRtICAL REv.

197 (1996); cf. MICHL

IGNATIEFF,

BLOO ANDBEWONGING:
JOURNEvs Iero TmENEw NATIONAISM (Farrar, Straus, & Giroux 1993). As Yack
notes, it is hard to understand German reunification, as opposed to the democratization of East
Germany, along Habermas's lines. Popular sovereignty is, Yack insists, more than "consensus [ ]
achieved in the course of argument ... from an identically applied procedure recognized by all."
See Yack, at 201 (quoting Jfrgen Habermas, Citizenshipand National Identity, in THEORZING CnzENsHip 259 (Ronald Beiner ed., SUNY Press 1995).
36

See Miller, supra note 1 (describing Verfassungspatriotismusas the foundation of West Germany's

legitimacy). One might argue that, until the 1980s at least, the economic miracle, frontline anticommunism, and philo-Americanism were the pillars on which (West) Germany rested.
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for example, and a more centralized bargaining regime, as well as tougher government enforcement of labor standards, the disparities between domestic and
foreign workers, while real, are less than those in the U.S. Indirect wages for
noncitizens are high by American standards, just as they are for native workers. Benefits are uniformly available, including child benefits, health insurance,
school and job-education allotments, long vacations, pensions, and so forth.
Shopkeepers and other petit bourgeois and business people are eligible for and
protected by the same programs as the security-obsessed Kleinbiirgertum.As to
civil and political rights, the picture resembles that of the U.S.: on nonimmigration issues, foreigners enjoy the same civil liberties as Germans; with rare
exceptions non-EU foreigners may not vote or occupy upper-level civil service
or political offices.
With security of residence, moderate family-unification rights, social rights,
civil liberties, and a high standard of living, why take the extra step of becoming German? Why risk losing benefits and rights in your country of origin-as
is often the case-in order to become part of a people who seem ambivalent
about having you? For one thing, Germany is now home to many, and the new
Nationality Act finally recognizes that:
Children born in Germany to foreigners living here permanently are
to be given the chance to grow up in Germany as German nationals
from the outset .... The acquisition of nationality marks the beginning of
social integration.If children born in Germany go to nursery school here
and receive all their schooling and vocational training in a German
environment and already grow up in the awareness of being Germans
with all the rights and obligations this entails, they will develop important bonds and feelings of identification with Germany and the German
way of life.3"
Moreover, an amended Foreigners Act (§85) now allows for naturalization
after eight years, subject only to a sufficient command of the German language
and acknowledgment of the Basic Law.3 9 The new immigration laws
(Zuwanderungsgesetz) of 2004 and 2005 are not at all clear on this matter,
however, although recent administrative modifications all tend in the

38

Now, furthermore, "all those wishing to identify with... Germany as a democratic and consti-

tutional state are welcome as citizens with equal rights." Pouc AND

LAW CONCEPRNC FOREIGNERS,

supra note 31, at 54 (emphasis added).
The new Nationality Law (§4, 3) stipulates that children born in Germany to a parent who has
had an unlimited residence permit (Aufenthaltserlaubnis)for at least three years or residence right
(Aufenhaltsberechtigung) for eight years will acquire German citizenship at birth. If they also
acquire another nationality, they will need to choose between the two upon reaching majority.
Nationality Act, July 22, 1913, RGBI. at 583.
39

Gesetzes zur Neuregelung des Auslinderrechts [Foreigner's Act], July 9, 1990, BGBI. I, at 1354,
1356, §85 (last amended 2004).
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direction of greater integration pressure, pressure that might extend beyond
4°
Verfassungspatriotismus.
What has been striking, particularly in the last several years, is the emphasis on foreigners "integrating," something both sides ostensibly must want.
Less clear is whether foreigners are being invited to join an ongoing German
project, as it currently exists, or to join Germans in charting a future course for
themselves as seemingly equal partners in something new-the difference is
important. Nevertheless, an emerging consensus situates "nationhood in distinctively nonethnic terms revolving around social norms" so that nonethnic
41
criteria at least complement descent.
The German Basic Law, the font of constitutional patriotism, anticipates
and facilitates a strong welfare state. 42 Social minima and social consumption
require social consensus and solidarity. The distributive logic is one of closure,
not of market-style openness. Citizens and resident foreigners must be inside
the same closed system. The welfare state "seeks to take care of its own"; it is "a
kind of safe house in which to shelter its members from the outside world" that
they may be immune to competitive disadvantages and capital flight. 4' The
segmentation of labor markets must be avoided.
In the face of an eroding welfare state, it becomes more important to integrate so-called foreigners fully into the solidarity of the social life. Failure to
integrate at this point is an invitation to reaction, 44 among both natives and

4 See, e.g., Novellierung des Zuwanderungsrechts and Nationaler Integrationsplanverabschiedet [Amendment of ImmigrationLaw andIntegration PlanDecided Upon], 6 MIGRATION UNoBEVOtLKERUNG
[MIGRATION AND
POPULATION] (Focus Migration, Hamburg Institute of International Economics, Hamburg, Germany)
Sept. 2007, at 1-3, availableat http://www.focus-igration.de/index.php?id=913&L=O (in German).
For a more detailed discussion of the new citizenship and immigration laws, see David Abraham. After
Ethnicity and ConstitutionalPatriotism: Searchingfor a Capacious German Membership, in TowARD HmE
CoMPLMON OFEUROPE
41 See

8 8-100 (Joaquin Roy ed., Univ. Miami European Union Center 2006).

Levy, supra note 8, at 230 (documenting both elite and popular sentiment). See also CmUsTI

JOPPKE, SECriNG BYORIGIN: ETHNic MIGRATION IN THE LIBERAL STATE

N

(Harvard Univ. Press 2005). Updates

on the integration debate can be found at http://www.einbuergem.de.
42

The ways in which this is true and in which a more communitarian society with a greater sense

of solidarity is mandated cannot be addressed here. See David Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 UNIv. CHICAGO L. REV. 864 (1986): David Abraham, Liberty without Equality: The
Property-RightsConnectionin a Negative Citizenship Regime, 21 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 1, 32-38 (1996);
Kommers, supra note 32.
4'

Gary Freeman, Migration and the Political Economy of the Welfare State, 485
Sa. 54 (1986).
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Id. at 61, 62. Freeman puts it this way: "... reduce the power of organized labor by dividing the
working class into national and immigrant camps, by easing tight labor market[s] ... and by provoking a resurgence of right-wing and nativist political movements.... By making racially diverse
societies ... migration has complicated social and political cleavages [and] helped shift the ideological center of European politics to the right."
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foreigners. It is unclear whether "constitutional patriotism" is up to that task.
A much more individualized, neoliberal "thinner" society may be in a better
position to pursue integration around civic-constitutional and cultural principles than the "thicker" social vision that was also a part of constitutional patriotism in its heyday. This understanding, recently and very interestingly, has
led the German left away from multiculturalism and toward "mainstreaming."45 A house to live in.

45

For a clear hint of this integrationist turn, see 7 MIGRATION uND BEVOLKERUNG
[MIGRATION

AND POPULAMigration, Hamburg Institute of International Economics, Hamburg, Germany) Sept.
2002, at 6,available at http://www.focus-migration.de/index.php?id=913&L=0 (in German). By
2007, "integration" had moved to the center of the immigration docket. Cf.the earlier praise of
multiculturalism in DANiE CoHN-BwNDrr & THOMAS ScHMID, HE AT BABYLON: DAS WAGNIS DERMULTIKULTURELLENDKoRATiE [THE BABEL HOmEL N'D:ADVENURES iN MULTICULnRAL DBIoCRAcy] (Hoffmann und
Campe 1992): and CLAus LEGGEWIE, MULTIKuLn: SpfELREGELN
FUR DIE VIELVOLCERREFL'BLIC [MULTICULTUmAISM:RuLzs FOR A MULTINAONAL REPL'Uc] (Rotbuch 1993).
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